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Abstract: If Savulescu’s (2001; 2009) controversial principle of Procreative 
Beneficence (PB) is correct, then an important implication is that couples should 
employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into 
existence. Both defenders as well as some critics of this normative entailment of PB 
have typically accepted the comparatively less controversial claim about non-disease 
traits: that there are non-disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would 
in fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have the best life. We 
challenge this less controversial claim, not by arguing deductively for its falsity, but 
by showing that Savulescu’s central argument for this presumably less controversial 
claim fails. Savulescu offers intelligence as the paradigm example of a testable non-
disease trait such that testing and selecting for it would increase the likelihood that 
the child selected would be the one who is expected to have the best life (or at least as 
good a life as the others). We provide a series of arguments aimed at demonstrating 
that Savulescu’s argument from intelligence fails. If our arguments are successful, the 
upshot is not that PB is false, but more modestly, that the burden of proof remains 
squarely with Savulescu. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a much-discussed paper, Julian Savulescu 1 (2001; 2009) proposes and defends a 
provocative ethical principle—procreative beneficence. 
 
Procreative Beneficence (PB): couples (or single reproducers) should2 select the 
child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, 
or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information. 
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Over the past decade, numerous papers3 have taken critical issue with PB. One avenue 
involves challenging the principle by way of rejecting something that Savulescu highlights 
as an important practical implication of the principle, which is that couples should employ 
genetic tests for non-disease traits4 in selecting which child to bring into existence. 
Potential challenges on this score can be divided into two camps. Firstly, one might 
reject Savulescu’s normative conclusion about non-disease traits while granting the 
premise that there are non-disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would in 
fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have the best life (call this the 
non-disease-trait [NDT] premise)5. Alternatively, there is scope for a second type of 
opposition to Savulescu’s normative conclusion, which does not grant this premise. The 
strategy we pursue in this paper falls into the second category of criticism. However, in 
locating our approach, a further distinction is required. It is possible to pursue this second 
strategy either by arguing (i) that NDT is false; or (ii) that Savelescu’s strongest case for 
defending NDT fails.  
We think it would be overly ambitious to argue for (i); perhaps there are some non-
disease traits that are both appropriately testable and such that testing and selecting for 
them would have just the results that Savulescu suggests. At any rate, the current state of 
genetic research is not developed enough to support any sort of deductive line against 
NDT. 
There is, however, a good case to be made for (ii). Savulescu’s defence of NDT is 
one that appeals, at nearly every crucial juncture, to the trait of intelligence6. This is 
because he offers intelligence as the paradigm example of a testable non-disease trait such 
that testing and selecting for it would increase the likelihood that the child selected would 
be the one who is expected to have the best life (or at least as good a life as the others7). 
We think it is no surprise that Savulescu appeals to intelligence as the obvious 
candidate trait here, given his aim of supporting NDT: after all, intelligence is plausibly 
connected with various conceptions of human well-being. Moreover, of those genetic traits 
plausibly connected to well-being, intelligence is (unlike, say, moral conscience 8 ) 
something for which we might plausibly locate a testable genetic basis on which embryo 
selection would be possible. 
Despite its prima facie plausibility, we think that Savulescu’s paradigm case fails 
(on several fronts) to support NDT, and our contention that it does will be the focus of 
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what follows. To the extent that Savulescu’s appeal to intelligence fails, the primary case 
Savulescu actually offers for NDT is vitiated. We can appreciate the significance of this 
observation in the wider context of the debate as follows: without NDT, PB (if true) would 
fail generate the key mandate Savulescu tells us the principle implies. 
 
2.  The Intelligence Premise 
 
The specific claim we’ll now set out to defend, contra Savulescu, is what we’ll call 
Intelligence (INT): 
 
Intelligence (INT): It is not the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would 
increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who is expected9 to 
have the best life. 
 
We want to note at the outset that even if it is possible to test and select for intelligence, 
considerations to do with environment and context10 bear on the matter whether doing so 
would contribute to the betterment of the child’s life, and we will address some of these 
issues directly in this section. But first, we want to support INT by raising a more 
fundamental issue, which concerns the matter of whether intelligence can be defined and 
selected for in the first place. After raising some of these more fundamental problems, we’ll 
proceed in this section to defend INT by highlighting several considerations that favour an 
inverse correlation between increased testable aspects of intelligence (e.g. analytical 
abilities, perceptiveness and memory) and overall quality of life. These considerations, we’ll 
show, must be balanced against the considerations Savulescu cites that suggest a positive 
correlation between testable aspects of intelligence and overall quality of life. We’ll argue 
that, all things considered, the balance between positive and negative contributions of 
intelligence to quality of life will be about even. That the balance is even is a real problem 
for Savulescu’s thought that one should employ genetic tests for intelligence in selecting 
which child to bring into existence. This is because without being able to fall back on the 
defence that testing and selecting for intelligence raises the likelihood of the selected child 
being the one who is expected to have the best life, the third sort of considerations we will 
present in support of INT become more relevant. This third set of considerations concerns 
the fact that no matter which non-disease traits are selected for, there are a variety of health 
risks associated with in vitro fertilisation that threaten the likelihood that the selected child 
4 
 
 
would—out of the possible children one could have—be the one who is expected to have 
the best life11. Additionally, this third set of considerations highlights connections between 
genetic contributions to intelligence as balanced against the specifically environmental 
contributions to intelligence that would be associated with IVF. 
All things considered, we will show that there is good reason to think that it is not 
the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the 
child selected would—out of the possible children one could have—be the one who is 
expected to have the best life. Having already outlined the upshot of this result for 
Savulescu’s argument, we’ll now focus exclusively on INT.  
 
2.1 Intelligence and quality of life: What is intelligence, and what contributes to it? 
As noted above, we submit that the connection between intelligence and quality of life is 
not as straightforward as is often assumed, partly because of definitional hurdles. Many 
who hold that intelligence is positively correlated with quality of life do so on the basis of a 
varied range of assumptions about what intelligence involves. For one thing, some (e.g. 
Gardner (1983; 1985; 1993) suppose that there are intelligences rather than one form of 
intelligence12. Even if there were a consensus here—and one is hardly in sight13—there are 
considerable problems, as Newson and Williamson (1999)14 admit, associated with the 
prospect of measuring intelligence (however conceived)15; accordingly, evaluating the 
prospects of measurement is best accomplished against a definitionally thin background 
account of the nature of intelligence. 
For their purposes, Newson and Williamson accept the following minimal 
description of intelligence from Gottfredson (1997): ‘[intelligence] is a very general mental 
capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, 
think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience...16.’ 
Such an account of intelligence is intuitively plausible (as a thin descriptive account goes), 
and is also one on which it seems sensible to suppose that there will be multiple genes 
capable of contributing to the various abilities of which intelligence is comprised (and so 
multiple relevant genes that must be located and tested for). Although we have some 
reservations, we will not be challenging Savulescu’s contention that some such genetic 
bases for intelligence will include dispositions to have good memory and good 
concentration (among other things). 
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 Now, if we construe intelligence broadly in this way, a la Gottfredson, what can we fairly 
say is known about the genetics of intelligence? Savulescu (2001: 413; 421, fn. 9) suggests 
that research here is ‘rapidly progressing’, citing here Newson (2000), though Newson and 
Williamson explicitly say that the potential for the development of predictive genetic tests 
for intelligence is ‘overstated.’ One field of research that has led some to view the genetics 
of intelligence as ‘rapidly progressing’ is molecular genetic studies, which have sought to 
locate and characterise specific genes that play a biological role in intelligence17. This 
approach has yielded some success—for example, Chorney (1998)18 has discovered a gene 
sequence that contributes around 2% (i.e. approximately four IQ points) to the total 
variation of intelligence 19 . Even with promising leads towards identifying and 
understanding at least some of the genes that correspond with intelligence, the issue of how 
much of a contribution these genes make to intelligence remains extremely controversial. 
It’s important to consider just why claims about the genetic contribution to 
intelligence are so controversial; while the thought that intelligence is hereditary was first 
introduced by Galton (1869), there are good reasons why the dominant contemporary view 
is considerably more cautious. Presently, it is generally supposed that social and economic 
environmental factors also have a role to play in determining a given individual’s 
intelligence. As Plomin (1997)20 has argued, genes alone do not pre-determine intelligence 
but rather roughly indicate how likely a person is to be of a particular intelligence level. 
Accordingly, a new question becomes salient: on average, what proportion of contribution 
do genetics and environment respectively make to a person’s intelligence?  
It has not been ruled out that the specifically genetic contribution may be no more 
significant to intelligence than are these aforementioned non-genetic factors. For example, 
behaviour genetic studies by Chipeur et al (199)21 suggest that around 50% of intelligence 
differences (between people in a particular population) are due to genetic difference, 
though in any one individual the extent to which genes contribute to intelligence might be 
more or less than 50%. Crucially, the quantitative studies that yield this result use 
psychometric tests, and these have been subject to considerable criticism22. 
 Given these cautions, even if we nonetheless assume that we can locate the genes that can 
directly influence (to some degree) how intelligent a future person will be, it is at best naïve 
to suppose we thereby have the ability to ‘test for intelligence’. Consider, after all (as 
Newson and Williamson observe) that compared to IQ tests, genetic tests would likely be 
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less efficient at predicting intelligence; environmental and genetic factors are evident in IQ 
tests, while genetic tests will provide information about only the latter of these factors.  
  Plomin (1997: 100) claims that the significant environmental impact combines with 
the large amount of genes involved in intelligence to make it the case that any one gene 
relevant to intelligence will only contribute to overall intelligence in a minor way. 
Accordingly, Reiss (2000) speculates that we might plausibly bring about more intelligent 
people by focusing research on developing more effective methods of education and child 
rearing. Even if there are benefits to be gained from encouraging a more intelligent 
population, then, it is not obviously the case that genetic projects focused on intelligence 
would be powerfully instrumental in bringing this about.  
The relevance that the above has for our central contention is practical: our view 
that testing and selecting for intelligence does not obviously increase the likelihood of 
selecting the child who is expected to have the best life is supported by the fact that it may 
not even be plausible to suppose that we can effectively test and select for intelligence. That 
being said, let’s put aside the above concerns and assume for now that we can effectively 
test and select for intelligence using the fruits of genetic research. Would this really lead to 
selecting the child (of the possible children that one could have) that would have the best 
expected life? 
 
Do more intelligent people have better lives? 
We turn now to the considerations that Savulescu supplies for thinking that there is a 
positive correlation between intelligence and overall quality of life. He pursues two 
argumentative strategies here. Firstly, he argues that intelligence is a component of the 
general purpose means that are useful to any plan of life, and as such, provides individuals 
the freedom to form and act on their own conception of the good life23. Secondly, Savulescu 
advances a presumptive case for thinking that intelligence would promote well-being on 
any of several plausible accounts of well-being, including (i) the hedonistic account (on 
which what matters is the pleasure quality of our experiences), (ii) the desire-fulfilment 
view (on which what matters is the degree to which our desires are satisfied), and (iii) 
objective list theories (according to which there are certain activities that are good for 
people, such as worthwhile achievements, dignity, bearing children, knowing a lot about 
the world, developing talents, and so on)24. 
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With a view to assessing the cogency of his argument, we should note that if his 
second strategy fails, this significantly undercuts the plausibility of the first. Accordingly, 
our focus will be on the second strategy. 
 
Hedonism and Intelligence 
Savulescu submits that intelligence will promote well-being on a hedonistic account 
because the capacity to imagine alternative pleasures and remember the salient features of 
past experiences can facilitate the choosing of future pleasurable choices. This seems right. 
However, intelligence can also promote a lack of pleasure, and we will consider this point 
at a level of abstraction that corresponds with Savulescu’s own arguments that intelligence 
promotes well-being. Consider (in comparison with Savulescu’s suggestions) that being 
intelligent can easily lead to feelings of restlessness and to trouble experiencing long-term 
happiness—recall Hemingway’s oft-quoted observation (1995) 25  that ‘happiness in 
intelligent people is the rarest thing I know.’ Similarly, as Schopenhauer26 sees it, ‘the 
person in whom genius is to be found suffers most of all.’  Arguably, (for example), 
Nietzsche, Plath, Wittgenstein and Cantor (among many others) suffered significantly as a 
result of their high intelligence. They are not exceptions. Further, reflect on the number of 
highly intelligent people who have problems relaxing or ‘turning off’ their tendencies to 
examine and analyse information (ad nauseum).  
These tendencies can all cause significant displeasure in addition to a mere lack of 
pleasure27. Even more, studies published by Martin Voracek (2004, 2005, 2006, 200928) at 
the University of Vienna offer empirical evidence supporting (though at present 
inconclusively29) a positive correlation between intelligence and suicide. 
While intelligence does promote pleasure in some ways, it also promotes a lack of 
pleasure in other ways; accordingly, on a hedonistic account of well-being, intelligence 
cannot be fairly said (without considerable further argument) to promote well-being all 
things considered—instead, it appears after more judicious consideration, to roughly break 
even30. 
 
Desire-fulfilment and intelligence 
Savulescu claims that intelligence promotes well-being on a desire-fulfilment account 
because ‘intelligence is important to choosing means which will best satisfy one’s ends.’ 
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Again, it seems like this is right. Likewise, it is clear that intelligence can thwart one’s ends 
in some important cases. The sorts of cases mentioned in the discussion of the hedonistic 
account apply here mutatis mutandis. For example, for one who seeks the attainment of 
peace (broadly defined), intelligence can, for reasons previously suggested, stand as a 
frequent and potentially insurmountable barrier. Similar considerations apply vis-à-vis the 
end of happy friendships or relationships31. Intelligent people might find others predictable 
and uninteresting, while struggling to find suitably engaging romantic partners. In 
addition, intelligence is often resented (especially in childhood), and others’ feelings of 
inferiority can lead to social exclusion.  
 
Objective-list theory and intelligence 
Finally, Savulescu maintains that intelligence will promote well-being on an objective list 
account because ‘intelligence would be important to gaining knowledge of the world, and 
developing rich social relations’ (both of which are relatively uncontentious objective 
aims). However, note that these are but two of the ends Savulescu mentions when defining 
the idea of an objective list account. For example, he also mentions an ability to appreciate 
beauty, and this ability can easily be undermined by intelligence; the intelligence in virtue 
of which one can ‘see how things work’ can prevent one from finding the kind of beauty in 
wonder as would someone less intelligent32. In addition, if intelligence were to afford a 
heightened ability to appreciate beauty, would it not also afford a heightened ability to 
detect and comprehend just as much (or more) suffering? At the very least, it seems as 
though intelligence as a means to appreciating beauty breaks even in terms of effectiveness. 
In addition to the ideas advanced in the discussion of the desire-fulfilment account, 
there are further reasons to think that intelligence stands to hinder as much as foster rich 
social interactions. For example, a highly intelligent individual might be so consumed by 
intellectual pursuits that little energy or thought is directed toward colleagues, partners or 
family members. Alternatively, you might only appear to have rich social relations—people 
may deeply enjoy your company and conversational skills, but you in turn might find these 
conversation partners to be so transparent (and their ability to understand your own more 
complex psychology so contrastingly poor) that the social relations are not experienced as 
rich by you. 
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Memory 
By now it should be clear that the idea that intelligence just obviously promotes well-being 
is not nearly as plausible as it first appears. Savulescu primarily discusses intelligence 
broadly construed, but he briefly considers one candidate component of testable 
intelligence—memory. He defines memory in a highly contentious (and in the context, 
self-serving) manner, as the ability to ‘remember important things when you want to’ (p. 
420). However, having a good memory also involves remembering things when one would 
rather not, and at times being ‘haunted’ by these memories. Savulescu is right that selecting 
for genes that contribute to the memory component of intelligence may help you to avoid 
having a child who forgets to take a compass on a dangerous bush walk (as his example 
claims).  
On the other hand, that child may grow up to be haunted by perfect recollections of 
something awful that they witness, and the more vivid the recollection, the more acute the 
suffering. Indeed, de Quervain et al. (2012)33 have discovered that a genetic factor for good 
memory leads to an increased risk of developing psychological trauma. This study tested 
over a thousand healthy volunteers and found that those carrying a variant of the PRKCA 
gene had more brain activity in areas related to memory and exhibited an above average 
ability to remember learned information. Also investigated were the effects of the PRKCA 
variant gene on 350 survivors of the genocide in Rwanda. Those with the gene variant had 
more painful and psychologically troubling memories of the events that occurred during 
the genocide and were twice as likely to be sufferers of post-traumatic stress disorder. In 
sum,, it is not obvious that a good memory leads to more well-being than lack thereof. 
To recap, then, we have highlighted some substantial considerations that support a 
negative correlation between intelligence and well-being. We submit that balancing these 
considerations against the positive contributions of intelligence to quality of life show that 
intelligence is roughly as likely to increase well-being as it is to decrease well-being (on all 
of the plausible accounts of well-being that Savulescu mentions). This discredits the 
supposition that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the 
child selected would be the one who would be expected to have the best life, as it does not 
appear that that intelligence is reliably conducive to bringing about the best life34. In short, 
it does not seem obvious that we should ‘expect’ possessing a trait that breaks even in terms 
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of effectiveness as a means to well-being (on multiple plausible proposals) to be one that 
will improve a child’s likelihood of being the one that would have the best life. 
We can turn now to a different group of considerations that add additional weight 
to our claim that it is not the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase 
the likelihood that the child selected would be one that would be expected to have the best 
life. 
 
In vitro fertilization and quality of life 
Thus far, we have focused on issues that are intimately connected with intelligence. 
However, a second set of problems stands to discredit the claim that testing and selecting 
for intelligence will increase the likelihood that the child selected would be one that would 
be expected to have the best life. These considerations focus not on intelligence itself but on 
the practical risks of the scenario that Savulescu describes, i.e. one in which people who 
would not have otherwise required in vitro fertilisation to conceive nonetheless employ the 
process in order to select the ‘best’ child35. Our concern in this section is that IVF—which 
is required for selecting for any non-disease trait—threatens the likelihood that the child 
one tests and selects for intelligence would (out of the possible children one could have) be 
the one expected to have the best life. This constitutes further support for our central claim, 
INT. Our first set of considerations to this end concerns risks of ectopic pregnancy, and the 
second set of considerations concerns birth defects36. 
 
IVF and Ectopic pregnancy 
In an ectopic pregnancy, the fertilised egg develops outside the uterus (typically in one of 
the fallopian tubes). Almost all such pregnancies are unsustainable. In North America, 
ectopic pregnancy occurs at a rate of around 19.7 cases per thousand37, i.e. 1.97%, and the 
Ectopic Pregnancy Foundation lists those undergoing IVF as being in one of the ‘at risk’ 
categories. Some studies suggest that approximately 2-5% of IVF pregnancies are ectopic38, 
but even if the percentage is more like 1-3% (as the British Fertility Society estimates), this 
is almost twice the normal rate. If undergoing IVF comes with an increased risk of ectopic 
pregnancy, then--since using genetic tests for embryo selection requires IVF--genetic 
testing makes the chosen embryo less likely to survive until birth than is the possible 
embryo that results from natural conception. It’s being less likely that there will be a child 
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born in Savulescu's suggested scenario provides further reason to suppose that testing and 
selecting for intelligence does not clearly increase the likelihood of selecting a child that (of 
the possible children one could select) will turn out to have the best life. That we have 
already highlighted considerations that show that intelligence is about equally likely to 
promote well-being as it is to promote the inverse of well-being vitiates a potential reply 
from Savulescu. Specifically, it serves to undermine the claim that an increased risk of 
ectopic pregnancy is less significant (vis-à-vis the aim of selecting the child expected to 
have the best life) than is the alleged increase in overall well-being that results from 
selecting for intelligence. 
 
IVF and birth defects 
In addition to studies suggesting an IVF-conceived baby is less likely to be born than is a 
naturally conceived baby, it may be the case that children produced by IVF are more likely 
to have severe health problems. These risks must be weighed against the alleged benefits to 
a child’s well-being brought by intelligence. 
It is currently contentious whether IVF is correlated with an increased risk of 
serious birth defects, but there are some persuasive reports available. For example, Reefhuis 
et al (2009)39 observe that a 2008 analysis of data produced by the National Birth Defects 
Study in the United States found that infants conceived through IVF more commonly 
suffered from some particular birth defects. These included cleft lip (sometimes 
accompanied by cleft palate), septal heart defects (abnormalities in the wall of tissue 
between the two sides of the heart), oesophageal atresia (a segmented and closed off point 
of the oesophagus), and anorectal atresia (a malformed rectum). As Reefhuis et al note, the 
mechanism of causality is unclear, but the correlation between IVF and higher instances of 
these diseases is certainly present. There is also an established link between IVF and 
Beckwith-Widermann Syndrome (BWS), a condition that involves an over-sized tongue, 
post-natal overgrowth, abdominal wall defects and an increased risk of kidney tumours. A 
2004 study40 concluded that the risk of BWS in the sampled IVF population was ‘nine times 
greater than in the general population.’ Further, Newby (2003)41 discusses a 2002 study 
showing that birth records of children produced by IVF indicated that they were twice as 
likely to have birth defects (when compared to ‘normal’ births). These defects included 
Down syndrome (and other chromosomal abnormalities), heart defects, spina bifida (in 
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which the spinal canal and backbone do not close before birth), gastrointestinal 
abnormalities, club feet, and musculoskeletal problems. The children in this study were 
also more likely to be born early or at a low birth weight, as well as to suffer from cerebral 
palsy, which impacts brain and nervous system functions (including seeing, hearing and 
cognitive ability). More recently, Kelley-Quonn et al. (2012) have presented findings42 
supporting the claim that ‘IVF independently contributes a significant risk of congenital 
malformation in addition to known maternal factors.’ All of the aforementioned health 
problems are highly likely to reduce overall quality of life, and in some cases may also 
substantially shorten life. 
Although the Kelley-Quonn et al. study represents an important step in researching  
the link between the process of IVF and birth defects, in light of the currently limited 
evidence of a connection we do not wish to make the unqualified claim that the above 
problems are caused by IVF43. Our overall argument does not require that claim--rather, 
we submit that since experts do not fully understanding this apparently increased risk of 
birth defects, the burden of proof that IVF is not responsible for the defects lies with 
proponents of Savulescu’s view. This is because if it is the case that the process of IVF itself 
increases the risk of birth defects, this is one thing that counts against Savulescu’s claim 
that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child 
selected would be the one who is expected to have the best life. 
 If it is correct that IVF comes with an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy (which 
translates to a lower likelihood of being born) and/or an increased risk of certain 
substantial congenital abnormalities (which in some cases means a shortened life and in all 
cases means a reduced quality of life in an important sense), this further supports our 
central claim, INT44. Once again, testing and selecting for intelligence does not seem to be 
reliably conducive to bringing about child who has the best life. 
 
The interplay between in vitro fertilization, environment and intelligence 
In this final section, we will explore how testing and selecting for intelligence will often lead 
to circumstances in which the genetic contribution tested and selected for will (at best) 
break even with negative environmental factors associated with IVF that reduce the 
likelihood of high intelligence. 
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According to Melo-Martin (2004), ‘the average cost of an IVF cycle ranges from 
$10,000 to $43,000, excluding the costs of previous treatments and the post-natal expenses’, 
and many undergo multiple cycles in attempting to become pregnant45. The likelihood of 
IVF resulting in a live birth is commonly thought to be highly influenced by maternal age, 
and so the process will be most successful when the woman is at at the peak of her fertility 
(in the early to mid-twenties). That the optimal maternal age for IVF ends before a woman 
is in her late twenties combines with the expense of IVF cycles to make it the case that 
pushing all reproducers to select for intelligence means pushing them to attempt get 
pregnant at a younger age than they may otherwise have chosen46. With this in mind, recall 
that the general consensus is that genetics are not the only factor influencing intelligence—
environment also plays a role, and many factors in this environment matter, including the 
quality of schooling, home environment, rearing style and parental maturity. 
People generally have more resources to offer children later in life, and their 
completed educations and established careers usually leave them with more flexibility, 
allowing them to spend more time teaching and engaging with their children. For example, 
in a study conducted on 113 mothers aged between 35 and 56 (Gregory 2007), many 
testified to having emotional resources for parenthood that they were certain they lacked 
earlier in their lives47. One contributing factor was that most of these women had stable 
jobs and had achieved much of what they wanted in their lives and workplaces, giving them 
an increased ability to focus on raising children. We also think it plausible that younger 
mothers will less often be financially secure, and this lack of financial security will in turn 
mean that (for example) they will be unable to afford as high quality education for children 
as they would have later in life. This is especially likely to be the case after paying the steep 
price for at least one cycle of IVF. We submit that this suggests that young parents will, all 
things considered, be less likely to provide an environment that fosters intellectual 
development, both in the home and in education. So, even without the health 
considerations mentioned in §3.2, any benefit of selecting for genes involved in intelligence 
(which, again, we think is in balance with the costs of being intelligent) gets offset by the 
likelihood of negative environmental contributions of raising a child when you are 
younger, less mature, more selfish, less experienced, and most likely less financially secure. 
 
3.  Concluding Remarks 
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We have explored a cluster of issues here, but it is worth reiterating what we have not 
attempted to do. We have not (as many other critics of procreative beneficence have) 
attempted to directly refute PB, but nor have we tried to indirectly challenge PB by arguing 
against the normative claim Savulescu takes PB to entail: the normative claim that couples 
should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into 
existence. 
Our critical interest has been, rather, a premise (granted by both Savulescu and 
most critics), which we call NDT. Specifically, this is the premise that there are non-disease 
traits such that testing and selecting for them would in fact contribute to bringing about 
the child who is expected to have the best life. If this premise is false, then it’s false that 
couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring 
into existence. We haven’t attempted to argue deductively for the falsity of the NDT. 
Instead, we hope to have cast doubt on it (and by extension PB) by examining the 
paradigm example that Savulescu uses to support NDT—intelligence. We have argued that 
under closer scrutiny, appealing to intelligence does not succeed in supporting Savulescu’s 
claim about testing and selecting for non-disease traits. That the argument from 
intelligence fails to support NDT does not, we contend, imply that NDT is false. More 
modestly, it shows that Savulescu has not done enough to argue for it. 
Independently of the connection our argument has for the debate about procreative 
beneficence, we hoped to also reveal that some natural assumptions about the connection 
between intelligence, its testability, and its relationship to well-being are in some instances 
false and in others too hasty. We suspect that some of the practical setbacks that plague 
attempts to quantify, measuring, and selecting (via IVF) for intelligence will also apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to other traits that a defender of NDT might claim are plausibly 
connected with human well-being. However, an argument on this score is a topic for 
another occasion48. 
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